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ABSTRACT
The paper focuses on changes in property rights and policies regarding interactions be-
tween agriculture and nature in the Czech Republic. In the first part the recent situation
is reviewed. The institutional and organisational features and their development during
the transition and recent years are illustrated by the case study on the White Carpathian
protected landscape area. The key issue in conservation in the White Carpathians (as in
the number of other marginal areas) is to maintain grassland management at large scale.
While environmental policy lacks measures for maintaining grassland management,
respective incentives were launched in the frame of agricultural policy, although they do
not sufficiently consider environmental concerns. There are two other problem areas
hampering efficient organisation of conservation: uncompleted land reform and little
involvement of local population in determining conservation priorities. In the second
part, the paper examines three policy options for enhancing sustainability of landscape
and biodiversity on farmland. The proposed policy options each reflect the identified
problems in the White Carpathian case study.
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1.  Introduction
The paper refers to sustainable land management in marginal areas. These areas are of-
ten protected for its landscape and biodiversity values. Much of the land has poor soils
and the areas tend to be underdeveloped. Historically, low-intensity farming was prac-
tised maintaining the richness of the wildlife and the diversity of the landscape. Collec-
tivisation in the 1950s and the subsequent intensification of agriculture threatened the
area's natural values. In order to curb some of these adverse effects Protected Landscape
Areas (PLA) were designated in 1970s and 1980s.
The political change in 1989 and the following economic reforms led to both a sharp
economic decline and major structural adjustments in agriculture. Whilst, on the one
hand, these have resulted in reduced pressures on the natural environment, they have, on
the other hand, led to the extensive withdrawal of land management practices that had
been essential to the maintenance of landscape and biodiversity. The available nature
protection policy measures and approaches, however, were not appropriate to these new
threats, being rather blunt controls over the intensity of production.
In 1997, new agricultural legislation and policy were introduced which recognised the
need for compensation for restrictions on agricultural practices and provided a basis for
the gradual introduction of incentives to cultivate marginal land. However, this policy
has not been integrated with the governance of environmental protection. The obstacles
to the long-term sustainability of land management in the Czech Republic and policy
options to deal with them are illustrated by the White Carpathian Protected Landscape
Area case study. We identified two other principal institutional imperfections in land
management in the White Carpathians: Division and uncertainty surrounding property
rights to the land and the limited involvement of local people in determining how areas
should be managed and developed.
Cultural landscapes and biodiversity on farmland even in protected landscape areas are
outcomes of human interactions with nature. Thus their state will always depend on the
values and priorities of current local, national and global populations and the mecha-
nisms by which the priorities are transmitted to agents providing environmental quali-
ties. The central question of this paper rests in options to improve institutions, particu-
larly arrangements in order to get more environmental values on a sustainable basis.
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we introduce a theoretical concept. Then, we ex-
plain how the provision of environmental goods was organised in the case study area -
the White Carpathians - and make general conclusions. The final section defines and
examines policy options for institutional change enhancing sustainability of the organi-
sation of the provision of landscape and biodiversity on farmland
2.  Theoretical concepts
Our attention is paid to three goods (assets) – land, agricultural products (conventional
or ecological), and landscape and biodiversity. Property rights over these goods have
changed during the last decade. Land reforms (Land Law, 229/91) returned titles to land
to original (pre-1948) owners and their heirs in 1992-1993. Ratinger and Rabinowicz
(1997) listed outstanding problems with delineation of property rights to land. Among
them, uncertain subdivision of property due to inheritance and the prevalence of uni-
dentified/inactive owners have been the most pertinent problems regarding landscapeRATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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and biodiversity management. The steady depopulation of the marginal regions over a
long period of time has exacerbated these problems. The heirs of the original owners
may now live far away, may be unaware of their property or may have such a small or
uncertain stake as to provide insufficient incentive to them to pursue their claims.
In the effect of market liberalisation and commercial reforms, farmers (as all other en-
trepreneurs) acquired economic property rights over their “food & fibre” output. Since
that, farmers’ incomes have depended on selling their products instead of discretion of
central planners.
Landscape and biodiversity are another outputs of the land. For reasons that will be-
come apparent later we divide environmental output “landscape and biodiversity” into
four categories: Landscape (as composition of meadows, pastures and arable land, its
tillage etc.), landscape amenities (hedges, trees, (traditional rural) buildings etc.), biodi-
versity (diversity of species on a large area) and micro habitat protection (nature re-
serves). We deal with non-rival and (partly) non-excludable goods (Slangen 2001,
2002), especially if we consider their intrinsic values.
Lippert (2002) suggests associating the bundle of capabilities (to provide food and fibre
and to provide environmental qualities) to land and distinguishing between agricultural
and environmental attributes of land ownership. Bromley and Hodge (1990) use a
broader term ‘countryside and community attributes’ (CCA) to a bundle of non-food &
fibre attributes associated with land. Obviously, these attributes will not necessarily be
controlled by one and the same person. The fact that different agents may optimise agri-
cultural and environmental attributes (CAA) may lead to ‘divided ownership’. While
property rights to agricultural attributes are supposed to be held by farmers, environ-
mental attributes may finally be in hands of a non-farming person or organisation, e.g. a
'nature agent’ (for illustration see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Lippert’s scheme
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The question is which institutional arrangement (governance structure) ensures the op-
timal provision of environmental qualities. The arrangement will depend on transaction
costs (here: costs of enforcing property rights) arising with provision and transfer of
environmental attributes. Lippert (2002) distinguishes three kinds of transaction costs:
costs of excluding, cost of measuring the benefit, costs of monitoring inputs. If the sum
of production costs (inc. opportunity costs) and costs of excluding is below the value of
an environmental quality, the market will sooner or later provide for remuneration of theRATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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providers’ effort. If costs of excluding are prohibitive while production costs are less
than the (social) value of the environmental attribute, a territorial authority may promote
its provision. Then the remuneration modality will depend on costs of output measuring
(Lippert, 2002):
(a) If these costs are low (justifiable high) a result-related remuneration of the person or
organisation improving the environment will be preferable.
(b) If costs of measuring are prohibitive an action-related remuneration will be prefer-
able. Since the output is not measurable (at acceptable costs), the measure must rely
on such (farming) practices, which are supposed to produce desired environmental
effects.
Falconer (2002) pays particular attention to transaction characteristics as assets speci-
ficity, observability and inseparability in the context of farmers' participation in volun-
tary schemes for provision of landscape and biodiversity. In the theory of Williamson
(1991), assets specificity refers to the fixed costs related to a transaction or better to the
low opportunity costs that assets have for an alternative use (Vernimmen et al., 2000).
These fixed costs may relate to the particularity of site, long-term investment or knowl-
edge. Low separability (high inseparability) is often due to joint production of environ-
mental goods provided by agents. Joint production (by a number of agents) might be
associated with low observability of individual contributions and, hence, high costs of
measuring them. This we have already considered. Beyond this, there are often joint
productions, for which inputs by individuals are rather complements than substitutes.
Consider the production of landscape, if one land operator refuses to provide/maintain
certain landscape features (attributes) extra landscape management activity of another
land operator will not compensate (Falconer, 2002). Following Williamson (1985) we
can distinguish four types of contract-cooperation modalities: spot market, obligational
market, primitive team and relational team (Table 1).
Table 1 Governance structure in respect to separability and assets specificity
Low assets specificity High assets specificity
Separabilty Spot market: short-term contracts and
highly individualised incentives (high
observability)
Obligational market: contracts of
longer duration likely, easy imple-
mentation
Inseparability Primitive team: problems in identi-
fying individual contribution to over-
all performance. Contracts are more
complex than the spot market, with
more costly monitoring required.
Longer duration contracts (given the
costs of re-negotiation), but still rela-
tively short term as low specificity.
Relational team: complex organisa-
tion; tendency to opportunism- co-
operation, need of shared values.
Long-term contracts to capitalise on
the costs of building team capacities
with a greater role of organisational
incentives over monetary incentives.
Source: Falconer, 2002
Slangen (2002) following Lyons and Mentha (1997) is more precise and distinguishes
between contracts (terms under which property rights are modified/exchanged) and ar-
rangements (under which contracts are implemented). Three types of contracts are sug-
gested: classical, neo-classical and relational. In classical contracts, the identity of par-
ties does not matter, price is the most important co-ordination mechanism, safeguards
are of little importance and term is short. The relational contract is quite the opposite.
The identity and personal characteristics of parties in the relational contract are crucial,RATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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price is of minor importance as co-ordination mechanism, safeguards are very important
and the term is very long. In between there are neo-classical contracts, in which the
identity of parties matters, price is less important than co-ordination mechanism, safe-
guards are important and term of contract is longer. Obviously, contracts and govern-
ance structures are closely related. Intuitively, classical contracts relate to spot markets
(from Table 1), relational contracts to relational teams (which may take a form of envi-
ronmental cooperative) and neo-classical contracts to primitive teams or obligational
markets. Actually, transaction characteristics determine both features of contracts and
features of governance structures. The above discussion is summarised in Table 2. As
Menard (1997) pointed out, the best contract is a contract that can be set up and imple-
mented under low costs, with simple enforcement procedure. Therefore, the choice (or
evolution) of the governance structure will depend, besides the above-discussed trans-
action characteristics, on the completeness and complexity of contracts (Slangen, 2002).
Incompleteness results from bounded rationality, particularly if the environment is un-
certain and from opportunistic behaviour of the partners. Complexity has to do with
writing of and implementation of contracts mainly as a result of an unclear distribution
of residual control rights between parties.
According to Barzel (1997), the attribute, like biodiversity or landscape, is an impure
public good or a common good, i.e. it is under public domain. Therefore, we have to
deal with complex contracts. The contract might be settled as if all possible events are
foreseen, i.e. as complete contract; the corresponding governance solution will be the
(principal) agent model. In practice, it will be difficult to take all contingencies into ac-
count, hence, contracts for landscape and biodiversity tend to be incomplete. In this
case, the arrangement will depend mainly on the importance of horizontal co-ordination.
Table 2 Transaction characteristics and organisation
Transaction characteristics Features of contracts/organisation when transaction
costs tend to be high
Excludability non-market governance structures
Assets specificity need for long-term contracts
Measurability (observability) of out-
put
action-related contracts
Monitoring commitment and trust needed, securities important
Inseparability (low separability) horizontal coordination important
Source: own classification
For those attributes/environmental qualities for which horizontal coordination is essen-
tial, the relational contracts and relational teams (e.g. environmental cooperatives) are
proper arrangements. For the others it can be hybrid forms based on neo-classical con-
tracts. When result-related measures are justifiable and when specialisation and scale
effects can be expected, the introduction of a ‘nature agent’ (e.g. Conservation, Recrea-
tion and Amenity trusts, (Hodge, 1991)) can be considered, who has to be the ‘residual
claimant’ to the outcome of his effort (Lippert, 2002). Now, the question arises how the
discussed transaction characteristics, contracts and governance structures relate to vari-
ous environmental goods/services from the family of landscape and biodiversity. We
might get a notion of the linkage between goods and transaction characteristics from
Lippert (2002) and Falconer (2002) (Table 3).RATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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High High (attempts made) High
Micro habitat pro-
tection
High High Rather low (definitely
possible)
Low
Source: Lippert, 2002, Falconer 2002
This allows us to build an image of “optimal” governance structures for landscape and
biodiversity provision. It is obvious that due to high costs of exclusion we have to deal
with non-market arrangements. Assets specificity tends to be high for the family of
landscape and biodiversity goods, claiming long-term contracts. Due to high insepara-
bility, landscape and biodiversity will require significant horizontal coordination. Re-
sults and individual contributions in protecting microhabitat or providing certain land-
scape amenities are observable and measurable. Therefore, governance might be result-
oriented and relatively simple. Lippert (2002) suggests that landscape amenities and
microhabitat protection might be provided by (non-farming) ‘nature agents’ also due to
specialisation and scale effects.
On the one hand, we distinguish between the intrinsic value of the diversity and exis-
tence of species and the aesthetic value of landscape and visible richness of the nature,
on the other. We would argue that meadows in the White Carpathians provide public
goods to the global society in the form of the former values and to the local society in
the form of the latter ones (for an analogous example see Hanley et al., 1997). This dis-
tinction indicates another (possible) level of divided ownership besides that originating
from the agricultural (food and fibre) and environmental values. This definitely has an
implication for the “optimal” governance structure.
Due to prohibitive costs associated with environmental transactions (discussed above),
the private-rights-based regime leads to sub-optimal production of environmental output
(Grafton, 2000). Bromley and Hodge (1990) suggested to depart from the traditional
model and let the management (and exclusion) rights reside with the community or the
state. If community rights are to be successful in addressing common pool problems, the
collective interest must be accounted for in the decision-making and in the behaviour of
resource users (Grafton, 2000). Ostrom (1990) stresses the following prerequisites as
necessary for enduring community rights: Well-defined geographical boundaries, rules
acceptable by the community and tailored to the resource, monitoring and enforcement
capacities, resolution mechanisms for disputes, participation of most resource users in
changes to collective rules, and recognition of collective rights by the outside authori-
ties. Obviously, a property regime based on community rights is similar to the relational
team described above, deploying community social capital (commitment and trust). ARATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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property regime based on state rights is appropriate when large co-ordination is needed,
and economies of size exist in terms of processing of information, monitoring and en-
forcement (Grafton, 2000). In both, community- and state-based property rights regimes
the legal ownership of land does not matter unless it generates significant costs, which
do not occur under sole ownership. Current protected landscape areas can be considered
as state-rights-based property regimes at least to some extent (keeping in mind that we
have divided ownership due to the splitting of control (rights) over agricultural and en-
vironmental attributes). In the following paragraphs, we will first describe the current
organisation of the 'provision' of landscape and biodiversity, marking sources of signifi-
cant transaction costs. Subsequently, we will suggest institutional innovations resulting
in alternative arrangements with presumably lower transaction costs. It will include the
option of the relational team bringing together local people including farmers with their
social capital and representatives of 'global/national interest' (e.g. the state).
3.  White Carpathians case study
The White Carpathians are a mountainous area in the East of the Czech Republic on the
border with Slovakia. The area was settled for agriculture in the 16
th and 17
th centuries
when much of the forests were cut or burned down. The poor soils only allowed for a
pastoral agriculture of extensive cattle and sheep grazing with small domestic plots cul-
tivated for cereals and potatoes. Traditional farming - non-mechanised and relying on
low inputs - remained characteristic until the middle of the 20
th century.
After collectivisation, in the period between the 1950s and the 1980s, there was an in-
crease in the concentration of cattle stocks for both dairy and beef production. There
was a switch to housing the animals throughout the year. Mineral fertilisers were ap-
plied to the grassland, and the grass and hay were mechanically cut. The Protected
Landscape Area designation, imposed in 1980, was intended to safeguard biodiversity
from these changes.
The protected area extends to 71,500 hectares, just over half of it being agricultural
land. The zones with strongest protection - including restrictions on fertiliser and pesti-
cide use and prescriptions of certain aspects of land management - cover 28,300 hec-
tares, about a third of which is agricultural land.
Since 1989, the recession in dairy and beef markets has resulted in reduced concentra-
tions of cattle. On the one hand, this has led to a beneficial extensification of production
and animals have started to reappear on pastures. On the other hand, meadows that are
less accessible or fall under fertiliser restrictions have little value any more to the farm-
ers. The area of fallow agricultural land has grown, reaching 5 % by the late 1990s.
The significance of the landscape and biodiversity of the White Carpathians has been
nationally and internationally recognised. The meadows are amongst the most species-
rich plant associations in Europe, including many protected species. The mosaic of
meadows, pastures and forests and the varied topography produce a variety of habitats,
including some plant life adapted to dry conditions and some to humid conditions. This
biodiversity can be diminished in a short period of time by such practices as fertilising
or mulching, or by idling the land (Willems and Van Nieuwstadt, 1996). The land has to
be mowed or grazed (in the proportion 2:1, as suggested by LA PLA of the White Car-RATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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pathians). Stopping such management leads to shrubby growth that reduces the diversity
of species.
Table 4 Farm Structure in the White Carpathians
Farm Size (ha) Share in the Number of Farms (%) Share in the Area (%)
Above 500 0.2 48
10 – 500 0.8 16
Below 10 99.0 32
Source: Sample survey of the Information Centre for Moravske Kopanice (ICMK, 2001)
Decollectivisation and land restitution have produced a dual farming structure. A few
large farms over 500 hectares occupy almost half of the agricultural land; while 99 per-
cent of farms are smaller than ten hectares and together account for about a third of the
agricultural area. Most of the latter are household plots of less than two hectares. The
household plots and smallholdings are mainly farmed for direct consumption and for
supplementing other household incomes. The small and medium-sized commercial
farms are run by people, often pensioners, who are keen to re-establish their family
farms. Survey evidence suggests that these two groups are deeply committed to the
landscape. The large commercial farms, in contrast, are very profit oriented. They are
also sensitive to changes in market or policy incentives. They usually have land outside
the protected zones. Typically their businesses are differentiated into intensive food and
fibre production and extensive environmental quality management.
4.  The current institutional arrangement in the White Carpathians
4.1  GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES STEMMING FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The environmental policy for designated protected landscape areas comprises both di-
rect regulations (on the use of fertilisers and pesticides, on grazing, etc.) and contracting
for improving landscape and biodiversity (Law 114/1992). A requirement of proper
grassland management is not explicitly mentioned in the legislation; it is argued by the
environmental administration that it follows from the Law on the Protection of Agri-
cultural Land (334/1992, amended by 231/1999). This is obviously a weak point – such
a subordinated “legal” requirement is difficult to enforce. Originally, regulations on
protected landscape areas restrict property rights without compensation. As pointed out
by Slangen (2001), uncompensated regulations on resources would largely result in
their incomplete or inefficient use. Thus, the result of uncompensated regulations has
not only been that farmers have suffered from income losses, but also that land has been
idling (abandoned), reducing the provision of landscape and biodiversity attributes in
the White Carpathians.
Environmental legislation is implemented, monitored and enforced by the local admini-
stration of protected landscape area (LA PLA). Since 1992, the competencies and range
of tasks of this body have significantly increased along with the increasing conservation
requirements set to farmers and local communities. LA PLA is generally supposed to
manage all environmental attributes: landscape, landscape amenities, biodiversity and
microhabitats (see Table 3). However, the actual main LA PLA activity focuses on ful-
filling regulations (such as fertiliser application, restrictions on grazing, etc.) and nego-
tiating and governing contracts for microhabitat protection and landscape amenities.RATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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Being very limited in contract opportunities, the overall landscape and biodiversity
management relies only on information dissemination provided by LA PLA in associa-
tion with agricultural landscape management programmes (before 2000) and LFA pay-
ments (after 2000).
LA PLA contracts for microhabitat protection and landscape amenities present very
detailed management prescriptions with precisely calculated value of the service. In this
case, the governing body (LA PLA) knows exactly what it wants from the producer
(farmer) and can hence enforce the contract (Shleifer, 1998). The contracts assume
separability and sufficiently low (acceptably high) measurement costs. These contracts
are in principle available (accessible) for any land user operating in the area. However,
it follows from interviews with LA PLA representatives that the identity of parties mat-
ters. The administration is concerned about the ability and reputation of the contractor to
provide the service in a sufficient quality and at a reasonable low/high cost. Farmers are
interested in these contracts, particularly, when they wish to restore degraded land (of-
ten previously abandoned meadows). This creates a self-enforcing safeguard. The con-
tracts are not made for more than one year. The contracts (the programme) have been
criticised mainly for their uncertainties: there is no guarantee that proposed management
agreements will finally receive money from the state budget and the time spans between
proposal making and payment may be rather long. In the light of the outlined theory, the
LA PLA contracts are incomplete if we take the contract preparation period into ac-
count. Generally, contracts are not complex:
•   if farmers are interested (i.e. they also envisage “agricultural” benefit) they will
usually get the contract (provided financial resources are available) and
•   if landholders (owners or tenants) are not interested (because of the lack of “non-
environmental” benefit) the LA PLA will look for a nature agent.
In either case contractors are residual claimants.
Since the budget is very limited, contracting based on the environmental legislation is
almost exclusively used to improve or maintain the highest natural values or to restore
the habitats of valuable species, which as a rule is costly. There are obvious constraints
for the LA PLA to maintain biodiversity and landscape at a larger extent by these types
of contracts.
While observability or separability of transactions covered by the LA PLA contracts is
high, this is not the case for transactions directed to maintain/enhance the overall biodi-
versity and landscape. In fact, those are subject to legal requirements for certain farm
practices (no fertilisers, mowing). Monitoring capacities of the LA PLA are very lim-
ited; monitoring and enforcing related to biodiversity and landscape are, in general,
costly and, in particular, accompanied with high organisational costs resulting from the
“transitional” land tenure system. First, LA PLA identifies a landowner (in the cadastral
office) and then the landowner names the land operator(s). It is obviously an inefficient
system, since there are thousand landowners (and many of them are not identified), but
much less operators. Therefore (to avoid these costs), the LA PLA sees its role in per-
manent and patient education of agents acting in the White Carpathians rather than in
sanctioning improper practices, especially those which are subjected to the MoA sup-
port programmes. Extension capacities of LA PLA are also limited. However, a close
co-operation with other organisations, particularly NGOs (e.g. Czech Union for Nature
Protection, Information Centre for (development of) Moravske Kopanice) has been de-
veloped. Over the last decade, the LA PLA has noticed increasing interest of localRATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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agents - farmers as well as municipalities - in gathering information and exchanging
opinions on conservation practices.
4.2  GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE TO ADMINISTRATE INCENTIVES OF PROGRAMMES OF THE
MOA – AGRICULTURAL AGENCY OF MOA
The regional agricultural agencies (AA) of the MoA are responsible for administrating
contracts stemming from agricultural policy. On large scale, protection of landscape and
biodiversity has been encouraged by payments from the budget of the MoA. Initially
(1997-2000), it rendered support to landscape management. In 2001, it was replaced by
cross compliance associated with compensations for less favoured conditions and envi-
ronmental restrictions. The proclaimed objective of this programme has been to modify
farming practices in a way that would best yield environmental quality (biodiversity and
landscape). This is understandable, since historically “farmland biodiversity and cultural
landscape” are outcomes of agricultural cultivation of land. However, the programme
was launched at a time when farmers had tended to stop cultivating land at all. There-
fore, the primary objective of the MoA programme was to stimulate farmers to continue
cultivation by providing income incentives, while the environmental objectives were
supposed to be achieved by means of cross compliance. The original programme was
not restricted to farmers. Hence, nature agents (e.g. mowing and hay harvesting compa-
nies) emerged, which in contrast to farmers have been primarily oriented on the produc-
tion of environmental amenities. Two groups started to oppose this arrangement: the
first ones (farmers and their associations) argued that money determined to support farm
income flew out of the sector, while the other group (the conservation authority and
municipalities) expressed their doubts whether nature agents would contribute to
sustainability. The latter was based on the observation that nature agents were often not
local residents and were, thus, lacking local knowledge and commitment to provide the
service, especially when the programme conditions and budget continued to vary from
year to year. MoA responded to this criticism and restricted the eligibility to only farm-
ers. Moreover, a minimum livestock unit (0.15) per hectare was introduced with at least
half of it being cattle or sheep. With this regulation, MoA has coupled environmental
attributes to “food & fibre” production.
Facing a minimum livestock unit regulation in the MoA contracts, farmers more or less
have to combine commercial farming with relatively sophisticated marketing (beef mar-
ket). To cover the cost of conversion and make beef/sheep farming economically viable,
farmers need supplementary assistance. At the moment there are suckle cow and ewe
premiums, a premium for cattle or sheep on pasture and payments for ecological pro-
duction. Accepting the latter farmers are driven into even more sophisticated marketing.
In the effect,
(a) farmers maximise their income from (conventional) beef and sheep production,
while environmental services are minimised to the level at which they still get the
fixed payment per hectare. The transaction of producing and delivering the public
goods of landscape and biodiversity has become complex with quite a high degree
of uncertainty due to the instability of beef market and underdevelopment of sheep
market;
(b) if a farm switches to ecological production, the provision of landscape and biodiver-
sity is included in the farmers’ objective functions. However, unknown markets for
ecological products put the price premiums at risk. In addition, ecological farmingRATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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requires considerable knowledge (human capital). The complexity is high and it is
likely that the objective function will not be maximised.
Until recently, the AA lacked capacity to monitor all plots to which payments were as-
signed. Hence, there was a high risk of opportunistic behaviour and hidden actions of
farmers. In 2000, the AA monitored the region by aerial screening for the first time and
the evaluation was discussed with the LA PLA. The screening has shown that farmers
did not cultivate bands and strips of meadows along forests already invaded by shrubs
and young trees. This was interpreted as falsely declared area which accounted up to 20
percent of the total declared area. The AA claimed the subsidy to be proportionally re-
turned.
It was evident from interviews that land users (farmers) were becoming aware of this
monitoring capacity of the AA. Legally, farmers are entitled to get the payment on the
overall registered area. It is in the interest of farmers to remove all shrubs and forest
invasions. However, the removal does involve costs. Farmers will not do it until the
costs are outweighed by benefits, e.g. fixed costs per hectare drop while revenue (over a
period) per hectare increases. The former can be reached by expanding the area, the
latter may result from beef premiums or higher beef prices and increased beef produc-
tion. If grasslands are out of the zone 1, biodiversity and landscape value of shrubs and
bushes can be (it is likely) higher than the one of meadows. As a result, MoA payments
may contribute to a reduction of biodiversity and landscape value.
It is important to understand that aerial screening disclosed places that had been defi-
cient in treatment for long times, places where meadows had already reverted to scrub
with thick stems of shrubs that could not be cut by ordinary machines any more. In light
of the explanation given in the previous paragraph, farmers have had so far no incentive
to remove shrubs and treat the overall registered area. On the other hand, they have had
no basis for declaring less area. Furthermore, the AA continues to lack capacity for
monitoring the quality and current (short-term) absence of treatment (current compli-
ance). This brings us to the issue of trust and commitment. However, the identity of
parties gets only little attention in MoA contracts. The payments are mandatory and the
LA PLA approval of current compliance (non-violation of environmental regulations) is
formal. Actually, the LA PLA cannot do more than confirm that there is no record of a
conflict in the recent past, acknowledging that its monitoring is insufficient too.
The advantage of the agricultural support policy enacted in 2000 is that it has intro-
duced compensations for regulatory restrictions (e.g. on fertiliser application) in the
landscape protected areas (mainly in zones 1 and 2). It must be stressed that these com-
pensations likewise apply to mountainous areas. They do not constitute a separate pro-
gramme, and it is supposed that payments in zones 1 and 2 are high enough to cover
also income losses due to restrictions. It was evident from interviews in the White Car-
pathians that farmers had rarely been aware of this fact.
Despite the fact that the protection governance was legally placed with the LA PLA,
MoA contracts determine the provision of biodiversity and landscape. These contracts
are (were) weak management agreements with action-related remuneration. They lack
most of contractual features relevant to transaction characteristics of biodiversity and
landscape (identity of parties, longer duration, safeguards, non-price coordination etc.).
The MoA programme is largely criticised by the LA PLA for these imperfections. ThisRATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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attitude prevents LA PLA officers to take the agricultural support as a serious effort to
promote production of landscape and biodiversity.
4.3  WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Generally, commercial farmers have exhibited their willingness to provide landscape
and biodiversity by responding positively and to large extent to environmental and agri-
cultural policy incentives. Although their commitment has been limited to minimum
income, they need to survive. Currently, the maintenance and improvement of biodiver-
sity and landscape relies on commercial farming. In contrast, owners/operators of land
that do not engage in livestock farming have been “effectively” excluded from the agri-
cultural support. In order to get the payments, some landowners attempted to start cattle
or sheep production, but the majority of particularly small landowners have been driven
to rent their land to large commercial farmers/farming companies. Large operators in-
herited and gained the monopoly position on the local land (lease) market, i.e. there is
often one large operator surrounding one village. Thus the opportunity value of land has
dropped significantly and rents have fallen almost to zero. As a result, they also gained
the local monopoly and monopsony in providing environmental values. The position of
large operators is even strengthened by the fact that large farms reduce the need and
cost of horizontal co-ordination. Also LA PLA prefers to deal with large farmers in pro-
vision of overall biodiversity and landscape. However, more horizontal co-ordination is
still important in several respects: scale effects exist in conservation of some habitats
and species, in information collection and distribution and in organising marketing of
ecological products. This need is significantly underestimated by both LA PLA and AA.
The gap is filled by an NGO, the Information Centre for the development of Moravske
Kopanice
1 (ICMK). ICMK has initiated mutual communication among farmers, ex-
change of experience and knowledge and transfer and spread of environmentally proper
farming practices. It has also encouraged farmers to organise themselves in a marketing
co-operative to co-ordinate production and distribution of ecological and locally specific
(labelled) products. The listed activities indicate that ICMK plays an important role in
vertical co-ordination too. Since the NGO has mediated the communication between
farmers and authorities, it has contributed to improved co-ordination between LA PLA
and AA.
The mission of LA PLA highlights the preservation of high natural values for global
society, while it almost completely omits the fact that the protected area is the environ-
ment of local inhabitants and might be as well a place for recreation of urban people.
Officers of AA criticised LA PLA for little understanding that maintaining human set-
tlements (farmers) in the region would require to balance economic and conservation
interests.
Local people are concerned about the aesthetics of their environment as well as the
biodiversity. However, those members of local communities, who are not engaged in
commercial farming, find it difficult to participate in the protection of landscape and
biodiversity although their concerns fit with those of the LA PLA. This contributes to
the reservation of local people against conservation activities of commercial farmers.
                                                
1 Moravske Kopanice is a sub-region of the White Carpathians. However, the influence of ICMK exceeds
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Local authorities (mayors) clearly pointed out that for them wildlife and landscape char-
acteristics would in many respects belong to the local community. Therefore, they
claimed to be involved in organising the provision of these environmental qualities. In
the current support policy of MoA, the local municipalities missed a role for small local
land users and owners who (as mayors believed) might substantially contribute to the
character of the local areas. On the other hand, there is an evident wish of commercial
farmers, particularly those who switched to ecological production, to build a good
reputation among the local people. In their opinion, however, the current arrangements
were not helpful to this end.
Also NGOs miss to address the involvement of local people in provision, co-ordination
and finally positive consumption of environmental values, like biodiversity and land-
scape. The ICMK has concentrated on commercial farming and environmental attrib-
utes. The other NGOs tend to participate in conservation either directly (as nature
agents), providing some conservation services on their costs or indirectly by increasing
awareness among general public and donors. There is an NGO closely related to the LA
PLA (The Czech Union for Nature Protection, CSOP) doing both. For instance, CSOP
shares most of LA PLA’s perceptions of conservation problems, and most of the LA
PLA officers are members of CSOP too. Thus, other actors in the region consider the
activities of CSOP in the protected area to be LA PLA activities. The intention of CSOP
as well as of LA PLA is to renew most valuable meadows, often already assigned as
nature reserves, to their original pre-collectivisation state. This means in many cases to
clean in fact (long-)afforested meadows. CSOP/LA PLA are even more keen on doing
so, after they realised that on newly cleaned meadows biodiversity reaches a peak
within a few years. This activity is difficult to understand by the other farmers. Because
such areas are usually remote and too poor on nutrients for livestock feeding, it seems to
farmers strange or unfair that resources are spent there. The farmers argue that their
meadows and pastures nearby might have lower diversity of species, although their
landscape value is high (by contributing to very nice scenery).
5.  Policy options
The case study identifies obstacles to the long-term sustainability of land management
in marginal areas:
•   the division and uncertainty surrounding property rights to the land (or better CCA);
•   the limited involvement of local people (particularly those that are not commercial
farmers) in determining how the area should be managed and developed;
•   poor horizontal co-ordination including the difficulties of integrating measures and
policies for agricultural support and environmental protection – in the effect
•   split vertical co-ordination (between the LA PLA and MoA)
•   insufficient (MoA) contracts to govern transactions relating to biodiversity and
landscape
Here we present three policy options, addressing the above-identified obstacles:
(a) The state represented by LA PLA takes over the ownership and management of all
the land that is most valuable from a conservation point of view
(b) Improved horizontal and vertical co-ordination by integrating environmental and
agricultural policies at all levels; it should also include improved contracts for
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(c) Agri-environmental policies are delivered through local partnerships which ensure
that they are responsive to local people.
The options concentrate first of all on provision of overall biodiversity and landscape.
They are proposed to highlight some aspects of alternative property rights setting and
institutional arrangements.
5.1   POLICY OPTION A:  LA PLA TAKES OVER THE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
The officers of LA PLA favour a simplification in the institutional arrangements sur-
rounding the management and control of the land, i.e. unified ownership of all land at-
tributes. In their opinion, the most effective way of achieving this would be if the state
acquired the most valuable land in the sense of natural values. The LA PLA itself would
then become the provider of the public goods contracting out the maintenance tasks,
such as mowing the grass. In this way, many of the problems connected with inter-
agency liaison and inadequate delineation of property rights could be overcome. The
LA PLA also sees this as a means of avoiding the opportunistic behaviour of actors
(farmers claiming meadow management payments for land that has turned into scrub).
The idea of the LA PLA as landowner, however, is not widely supported. The repre-
sentatives of the municipalities, the officers of the Agricultural Agency and the local
farmers – they all oppose the LA PLA's preferred model. The municipal representatives
fear that it would force people from the region leading to a loss of rural amenities. The
AA officers argue that the landscape of the White Carpathians was a cultural one that
was the outcome of the interaction between farming and nature. The local farmers fear
that they would lose their livelihoods.
The key element of this proposal rests in the extent of which exclusion rights are held,
particularly rights on those environmental attributes that are joined with the agricultural
ones. It is obvious from the case study that LA PLA feels in the position of a claimant,
i.e. holding management rights but not the exclusion right over ecological attributes. LA
PLA blames agricultural policy of protecting farmers against exclusion, what makes it
difficult to exercise management (rules). In fact, the landowners do not hold the exclu-
sion rights over all CCA, particularly, ecological attributes (as held by PLA). Because it
is impossible to separate agricultural and ecological attributes and distribute the control
over them to farmers and the LA PLA, respectively, co-ordination is needed.
The purchase of land by the state and the consequent management by an environmental
administration (e.g. LA PLA) might be regarded as a very pragmatic approach in the
respect of reducing co-ordination costs. However, unified ownership will improve co-
ordination only partly. As the separation of agricultural and ecological attributes is im-
possible, it is also impossible to lease agricultural or ecological attributes separately. At
the same time, LA PLA may loose provision of landscape features, which are linked to
farmers’ dwelling in the countryside, and probably are better achievable by co-
ordination at community level or even by an individual property rights regime.
In contrast to current LA PLA contracts, the contracts for overall biodiversity and land-
scape will have to be related to input, requiring much higher monitoring costs and sig-
nificant horizontal co-ordination of contractor activities. Moreover, we found that the
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when removing shrubs. But this interest will probably vanish. As pointed out by Fal-
coner (2002), farmland biodiversity and cultural landscape maintenance require rela-
tional teamwork, a precondition that will not change with the change of ownership.
Therefore, more stable (long-term) co-operation with agents will remain very important.
The obvious advantage of this option is that the land managers at PLA have all infor-
mation about conservation needs and practices at hand. Despite this potential benefit of
state-based rights, many examples exist that common pool resources degraded under
PLA management, especially when state-based rights superseded pre-existing private or
community rights (Grafton, 2000).
5.2  POLICY OPTION B:  IMPROVED HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CO-OPERATION BY IN-
TEGRATING AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
The second option responds to the loss of environmental benefits due to the split of co-
ordination competencies between MoA and MoE, on the one hand, and insufficiently
designed contracts, on the other. It is proposed as a unified agricultural and environ-
mental policy framework that sets certain restrictions on land use (and compensates
them) and provides incentives to farmers to produce environmental amenities. This op-
tion recognises that the land and natural environment in protected areas as the White
Carpathians are probably best managed and conserved through extensive farming.
This scenario differs from the current political and organisational arrangement in so far
as it supposes co-ordination to be fully in hands of the local administration of protected
landscape areas, while financial resources will continue to flow from the MoA budget.
In practice, the contracts will be made between farmers and the LA PLA that decides on
the choice and targeting of measures. To facilitate achievement of desired environ-
mental effects, the agri-environmental policy has to be rich in measures. Therefore, we
suppose that also the national agri-environmental programme framework should be set
up in close co-operation between MoA and MoE. Grassland management will be en-
sured by neo-classical contracts; their duration will be expanded (to 5 years) and the
applicant will have to demonstrate that he/she has the capacity to provide the service at
the expected extent and quality. Non-use values (e.g. scrubs along the forests) will be
recognised and hence contracted with farmers. However, more relational contracts will
still be needed for overall protection of landscape and biodiversity. This demand results,
for instance, from the highly fragmented land ownership that may hinder sustainable
management of many high natural valuable sites if sufficient co-ordination and co-op-
eration are missing.
In protected landscape areas, it will necessary to strengthen/build up LA PLA capacity
to prepare, negotiate and co-ordinate new contracts. Implementing contracts of neo-
classical character requires deploying social capital of local provenience. It seems (from
the case study analysis) that there is sufficient social capital available in the White Car-
pathians. Doubts may arise if the situation is similar in all other 27 protected landscape
areas and national parks.
It may also be doubtful whether this option improves participation of non-farming
population. It can be expected that MoA funds are only eligible for farmers, constituting
the continuous need for additional MoE measures and budget funds. The proposed ar-
rangement for PLAs will not be applicable to organising the provision of landscape andRATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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biodiversity in marginal areas outside the PLAs. Such organisational efforts outside the
PLAs will require increasing capacities at the agricultural agencies (to ensure that the
contracts will be neo-classical). However, a local partner with environmental concerns
would be desirable.
5.3  POLICY OPTION C:  AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES DELIVERED THROUGH LOCAL
PARTNERSHIPS
This policy option responds to imperfections in horizontal and vertical co-ordination in
the current arrangement: insufficient MoA contracts and inadequate (poor) involvement
of local people in the decision making on how the area should be managed and devel-
oped. In this scenario, farmers are still the entitled land users (owners, rightful tenants),
but the local community has a right and a capacity to influence the level and quality of
environmental services provided in the PLA; i.e. to set rules (management right) and
regulate access to the resource (exclusion right). The scenario reflects the argument that
the local community is the most important consumer of environmental goods. It might
be the landscape, in general, a number of landscape amenities or some wildlife that will
contribute to the exclusivity of a site (village) and may attract tourists. Likewise, it can
be a spot nature reserve or a particular protected animal that yield the same effect.
Basically, this option would raise the influence of the local community in decision-
making. It would require a substantial revision of the policy framework, on the one
hand, and of the local arrangement, on the other. The main change would rest in the
need for consensus amongst all local actors (representatives of the local people, the LA
PLA, representatives of the farmers, the AA, etc.) about development and conservation
priorities at the local/regional levels. To reach consensus an organisation is needed. We
suggest establishing an environmental co-operative involving at least the above-
mentioned actors as members. Such co-operative should be obligatory in the protected
landscape areas and voluntary outside them. The co-operative would facilitate public
discussion on conservation in the area of concern. The role of the LA PLA would
change from a master planner toward a representative of national and global interests in
the public discussion.
The important output of the public discussion and the work of the co-operative will be a
master (management) plan. In the protected areas it will have defined minimum con-
tents. The master plan sets the rules of using land in relation to most agricultural and
environmental attributes. It is evident that agricultural, environmental and rural devel-
opment policies will merge at the local level. It will be preferable if the policies are co-
ordinated at the national level as well. Similarly to Option B, the policies have to be rich
in the measures they offer. Also the budget should be reasonably balanced. To ensure a
serious involvement of municipalities and underline their decision-making role, co-
financing (rather very small) is proposed. The introduction of a co-operative and the
involvement of local authorities will increase horizontal co-ordination and facilitate
relational contracts. Of course, the national programme/budget framework should be
settled for long time periods to ensure that the costs are covered that arise with building
relational teams.
There are several difficulties associated with this policy option. First of all, it would
represent a major shift away from the current arrangements. It would require a new fi-
nancial framework, which may be difficult to agree at the very top level if the agricul-RATINGER, KRUMALOVÁ and PRAZAN – Institutional Options for the Conservation of Biodiversity
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tural lobby is too strong. Another weakness of the scenario may show up if the power of
the local community is high but environmental awareness low. Then the production of
environmental goods will likely be much lower than socially (nationally, globally) de-
manded. Furthermore, a local community/co-operative may lack capacity to control
farmers who have a strong position both as large farmers and beneficiaries of specific
agricultural policies. Farms of one to two thousand hectares usually spread over a terri-
tory of two or more villages. This might require that villagers come together and create
micro-regions (one micro-region can cover the whole protected landscape area), but it
will definitely require that the power of environmental co-operatives, operating in the
communities or micro-regions, will be recognised by the government. And in the end,
there might be little potential for collective action, which would lead to a failure of this
policy option.
This policy option is attractive for its assumption that if the local community actors get
more responsibility in the organisation of environmental services conservation aware-
ness will grow in the area and the local community will give its support to the local
farmers as providers of these services. If such a policy is successful, the effect of social
learning amongst policy actors (especially local community stakeholders and farmers)
will substantially increase the sustainability of nature conservation.
6.  Conclusions
Options were designed to highlight certain aspects of institutional arrangements for pro-
vision of landscape and biodiversity. We particularly investigated the following char-
acteristics: who actually organises, sets rules and provides landscape and biodiversity,
which kinds of organisational forms are available, what are the requirements for social
capital and how are economies of size reflected or the needs for large-scale co-
ordination. Table 5 summarises and compares the options with respect to the mentioned
characteristics. The gradual change of the role of the state throughout the options can be
observed. While in the first option the state is entirely responsible for landscape and
biodiversity management, in the third option, the state sets minimum rules and author-
ises locally or regionally based bodies, i.e. environmental co-operatives, to organise the
provision of biodiversity and landscape. The participation of farmers or nature agents in
decision making is gradually increasing. The need for social capital goes hand in hand
with it.
Table 5 Comparison of option characteristics
OPTION A B C
Who does organise? State State/ participation of
farmers essential
Local partnership
Who does set rules?
(management right)
State State State + local partner-
ship
Provider State Farmers Farmers, nature
agents







Need for Social capital Little concern Medium (to enable
neo-classical con-
tracts)
High (to enable col-
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Reflection of economies






pends on the size of a
co-op)
Source: own classification
In Option A, the involvement of local inhabitants is not of concern, while in the other
two scenarios local people matter. The state will carry high costs of horizontal co-
ordination if it is not able to deploy local social (and often also human) capital. Such a
organisation will require a lot of trained staff and a well-designed decision making pro-
cedure. Option C is preferable to scenarios A and B if there is little benefit from econo-
mies of size in terms of information and enforcement. Measurement cost is also an im-
portant determinant for the choice of options. Local partnership may significantly re-
duce these costs due to a high level of trust. State-based regimes may carry these costs
and deploy relatively expensive technical equipment. Locally/regionally based organi-
sations will always tend to suffer inability to envisage implications of their decisions in
the national or even global context.
If attributes (groups of attributes) are (weakly) separable from other countryside and
community attributes, all three regimes may co-exist. However, it seems that Option A
has only very little potential to improve the provision of landscape and biodiversity. It
may be used in case that there is actually very little interest by local land users/owners
to cultivate land in the way which ensures high natural values. Option B is very close to
the current arrangement. Transition costs are rather low – it will be rather political costs
(loss of control) that have to be paid. Adopting Option B can be regarded as the first
step of improving organisation for providing landscape and biodiversity. The following
step will be to merge this option with Option C wherever this will be relevant.
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